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Project Operation Whitecoat: 
Military Experimentation, Seventh-Day Adventism 
and Conscientious Cooperation  
 
BY ALICIA GUTIERREZ 
 
ABSTRACT: From 1954-1973, the U.S. Army established an 
unlikely alliance with the Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA) Church 
and their unequivocal support for a series of biomedical 
experiments called Project Operation Whitecoat (POW). In a letter 
dated October 19, 1954, Dr. T. R. Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical 
Department of the General Conference of SDAs wrote to then-
Surgeon General Major George E. Armstrong, “the medical 
research project which you have under way… offers an excellent 
opportunity for these young men to render a service which will be 
of value not only to military medicine but to public health 
generally.”1 While the notion of church, military and government 
cooperation, especially in regards to human experimentation may 
seem incongruous, unorthodox and paradoxical, the nature of the 
relationship that the church was able to maintain with the military 
hierarchy allowed for a series of biological experiments that can 
be considered a model of ethical human experimentation. 
 
According to testimony by the United States General Accounting 
Office to the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, 
Committee on Government Operations in the House of 
Representatives, a shroud of secrecy surrounds government 
sponsored experiments conducted on humans between 1940 and 
1974.2 Since the Nuremberg trials, which condemned the acts of 
Nazi doctors, US agencies adopted the Nuremberg Code.  The 
Nuremberg Code requires that researchers obtain informed consent 
                                                
1 T. R. Flaiz, M.D., “Letter to Major General George E. Armstrong,” October 
19, 1954. 
2 Human Experimentation: An Overview on Cold War Era Programs 
(Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, September 28, 
1994), 3. 
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before conducting any research involving human subjects.  
Researchers are also required to allow their human subjects the 
freedom to discontinue participation in any study in which they are 
involved as human subjects.  Despite these codes designed to 
protect the rights of human subjects in research, in terms of 
government and/or military medical experimentation after World 
War II, no overarching or overseeing agency existed to ensure that 
these experiments were being executed in accordance with federal 
laws or policies, such as the Nuremberg Codes.3 Between 1954 and 
1973, a series of ethical experimentation was conducted in the 
United States that stood in sharp contrast to regulations that might 
have better protected the humans involved in the research.  
Project Operation Whitecoat (POW), as it was called, was a 
code name for an alliance between the US Army and the Seventh-
Day Adventist (SDA) Church to provide an alternative means by 
which Seventh-Day Adventists could serve their county militarily.  
This alternative means of service meant that Seventh-Day 
Adventists would become the subjects of military medical 
research. In a letter dated October 19, 1954, Dr. T. R. Flaiz, 
Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference of 
SDAs wrote to then-Surgeon General Major George E. Armstrong, 
“the medical research project which you have under way… offers 
an excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service 
which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public 
health generally.”4 Attached to this letter was a preliminary 
statement by the General Conference regarding the use of 
volunteers for medical research. It stated, “it is the attitude of 
Seventh-Day Adventists that any service rendered voluntarily by 
whomsoever in the useful necessary research into the cause and 
treatment of disabling disease is a legitimate and laudable 
contribution to the success of our nation and to the health and 
comfort of our fellow man.”5  POW gave Seventh-Day Adventists 
a way to serve the country in a meaningful way that did not 
involve fighting in a war directly.   
                                                
3 United States General Accounting Office, Human Experimentation, 1. 
4 Flaiz, 10. 
5 Statement of Attitude Regarding Volunteering For Medical Research (The 






   Surprisingly little, if any, research has been done on POW. 
Because of the direct involvement of the SDA church and the strict 
supervision of the Army surgeon general, POW was able to 
distinguish itself away from the shroud of secrecy surrounding 
other military experiments and serve as a model for conscious, 
ethical human experimentation in an era when deception ran 
rampant.  
The Seventh-Day Adventist Church in America: A Brief Military 
History  
 
Throughout its history, the SDA church has been actively engaged 
and concerned with the involvement of its members in the military. 
In order to better grasp the role that the SDA church was able to 
play in POW, it is important to look at its history through the lens 
of military relations.  The SDA church emerged from the Christian 
Connection and later, the Millerite Movement. The Christian 
Connection was “a religious body that in the mid-nineteenth 
century was fifth in membership within the United States.”6 One of 
the founding beliefs in this movement was literal interpretation, 
and sole authority, of the Bible. This included observance of the 
seventh-day (Saturday) as the Sabbath and the belief in the “literal 
soon advent of Christ.”7 
 Baptist preacher William Miller was renowned for the 
knowledge that he displayed when interpreting the Bible. He 
believed that Christ’s second coming was fast approaching which 
prompted believers and scores of churches to adopt the name 
‘Adventist’ for themselves by the 1830s and 1840s.8 Some 
Adventists followed Miller’s belief that based on his calculations 
the Second Advent would occur in 1844. There were others, 
however, who believed that Christ’s advent could not be 
determined, and was yet to arrive, causing a theological schism. In 
1844, a small wood structure in Washington, New Hampshire 
became the first ‘Adventist’ church, and on May 21, 1863, “the 
                                                
6 “History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church,” 
http://www.adventist.org/world_church/facts_and_figures/history/index.html.en 
(accessed June 25, 2010).   
7 “History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.”  
8 “History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.” 
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denomination was officially organized… [and] included some 125 
churches and 3,500 members.”9 
 The early SDA church placed an important emphasis on 
freedom. As the church itself points out, because of this, SDAs 
“worked toward abolition of slavery as well as roles for women in 
the church… Freedom was also emphasized through an orientation 
toward temperance and health reform… Thus within nineteenth-
century Adventism one finds strong anti-slavery actions, women 
licensed as ministers, and health reform principles that included 
abolition of alcohol and tobacco.”10 This movement towards 
freedom, especially anti-slavery sentiment, caused SDAs to side 
with the North during the Civil War. According to a statement 
released by renowned Adventist prophetess Ellen G. White in 
1863, “God gives him [the slaveholder] no title to human souls, 
and he has no right to hold them as his property... God has made 
man a free moral agent, whether white or black. The institution of 
slavery does away with this and permits man to exercise over his 
fellow man a power, which God has never granted him.”11 Yet, 
literal interpretation of the Bible, including the Sixth 
Commandment that forbids killing, put them at odds with the 
military. Because of the Civil War, the SDA church was forced to 
deal with this ideological dilemma just as the church was being 
formed.12  In 1863, the Union implemented conscription and the 
SDA church took an official stance against military service. This 
clearly resonates from White’s prophecy: 
 
God’s people… cannot engage in this perplexing 
war, for it is opposed to every principle of their 
faith. In the army they cannot obey the truth and at 
the same time obey the requirements of their 
officers… Those who love God’s commandments 
will conform to every good law of the land. But if 
the requirements of the rulers are such as conflict 
                                                
9 “History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.” 
10 “History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.” 
11 Ellen G. White, “The Rebellion,” in Testimonies for the Church, vol. 1, 4th 
ed. (Mountain View: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1948), 358. 
12 Ronald Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers? Seventh-Day Adventists and 







with the laws of God, the only question to be settled 
is:  
Shall we obey God, or man?13 
 
The SDA position on war made them a minority, which resulted in 
some disdain and contempt, yet they were not faced with legal 
penalization. When a member of the SDA church was drafted, the 
congregation utilized a provision allowing them to pay their way 
out of military service.  Thus, drafted men were able to avoid 
military service by paying a $300 commutation fee. When a poor 
member of the congregation was drafted, the church worked 
together to raise money, thereby cementing a legacy of the SDA 
church involving itself in individual members’ military affairs. In 
1864, the military created a stipulation allowing people or religious 
organizations to file for noncombatant status; however, the 
Adventist church did not immediately seek to gain recognition 
under it because they felt secure, confident and protected by the 
general accessibility of the commutations fee. When the 
commutation fee became subject to restricted use in July of 1864, 
the SDA church sought to gain recognition as noncombatants and 
ultimately received it from the state and federal levels of 
government.  
Along with the end of the Civil War went any further 
discussion of SDA military service. Although SDAs admonished 
the Spanish-American War of 1898 and encouraged pacifism, the 
lack of conscription did not necessitate any further action. But 
when World War I erupted and conscription once again became an 
issue that members had to face directly, the SDA church developed 
a new viewpoint on what it meant to be a noncombatant. 
When the draft was implemented for World War I, the 
SDA church took a major step in their stance on military service. 
Avoiding the myth that church doctrine was fait accompli, the 
SDA church changed their definition of noncombatant service. 
According to sociologist Ronald Lawson, “instead of being 
pacifists who refused to be involved in war, Adventists would now 
respond to the draft but refrain from bearing arms. As unarmed 
soldiers, they would not kill but do good.”14 This conversion did 
                                                
13 White, 361-362. 
14 Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers?,” 198. 
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not come without debate. A week after the U.S. declared war, 
Adventist leaders met and petitioned that Adventists “be required 
to serve our country only in such capacity as will not violate our 
conscientious obedience to the law of God.”15  Dr. Lawson 
believes that this change was an attempt by the church to move 
away from ‘sect’ towards ‘denomination.’ According to Lawson, 
who utilizes Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge’s church-
sect theory:  
 
A highly sectarian group has high tension with 
society, a mainline denomination low tension, with 
a continuum between the two representing varying 
degrees of tension. As a group moves from sect 
towards denomination, this is indicated by 
relaxation in tension… When a religious group 
concludes that military service contravenes its 
principles and rejects the call to arms, that decision 
marks it as different. Depending on the political 
context, it may elicit antagonistic responses—scorn 
and harassment from the public and punishment by 
the state. This indicates that the group’s tension 
with society is high— that it is towards the sect end 
of the church-sect scale. Since many sects, over 
time, reduce their tension with society and move 
towards the church end of the scale, a sect holding a 
deviant position on conscription is likely to modify 
its stand in order to reduce tension.16 
 
In other words, religious denomination and sect sit at opposite ends 
of a sliding scale. ‘Sect’ or ‘denomination’ is determined by a 
group’s tension with society. If a group’s religious doctrines or 
practices place them in a position where they are at odds with 
mainline society, they are considered a sect. Consequently, the 
more a religious group’s doctrines and practices fit within mainline 
society, the more they are considered a denomination. If a group 
                                                
15 Douglas Morgan, “Adventist Review: Between Pacifism and Patriotism,"  
http://www.adventistreview.org/2003-1535/story5.html (accessed June 25, 
2010).   






does not want to retain the stigma associated with being considered 
a ‘sect,’ then the best way to do this would be to reduce the 
“tension” with society by adjusting their beliefs and practices to fit 
mainline society. 
The shift from non-militarized pacifists, who paid 
commutation fees to avoid the draft, to militarized noncombatants, 
who allowed themselves to be drafted, yet, classified differently 
not to bear arms, did not seem to challenge SDA and biblical 
doctrine. SDAs did not see a problem with aiding the sick. They 
believed that whatever a wounded soldier decided to do after being 
rehabilitated was not their responsibility. They were proud, 
patriotic and willing to offer any assistance to their country so long 
as it was harmonious with their religious conviction. Further, this 
would create a legacy that combined patriotism with pacifism in a 
way that was religiously based.17  
Based on biblical principles, SDAs long believed that it 
was important to give to God what is God’s and give to Caesar 
what is Caesar’s.18 In other words, while SDAs believed that their 
primary duty was to serve God, this adherence to God’s law and 
the bible should not get in the way of their duties and 
responsibilities here on earth (granted they do not conflict with 
biblical principles). SDAs believed that it was imperative to follow 
civil authority because it maintained order. Further, by being good 
citizens and not stirring up agitation or confrontation, SDAs would 
not be harassed for avoiding their duty to the country in a time of 
war, and might even be regarded highly for doing their service.19 
Good citizenship would allow the SDA to remain in good favor 
with the government and allow the individual to continue to enjoy 
the comfort and protection the government provides him (or her).  
In order to prepare SDA men for noncombatant service, the 
North American Division of the SDA church established training 
schools at its colleges and academies in conjunction with the Red 
Cross. This allowed young men who were predisposed to the draft 
                                                
17 Morgan, “Adventist Review: Between Pacifism and Patriotism." 
18 Based upon Matthew 22:21, in which several disciples asked Jesus if it was 
right to pay taxes to Caesar to which he replied that Caesar should be given what 
is his. 
19 Francis McLellan Wilcox, Seventh-Day Adventists in Time of War 
(Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1936), 28. 
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to acquire basic medical training so that they would be attractive 
candidates for noncombatant medical units within the military. 
This also worked well with the church because providing medical 
aid would not conflict with allowable activity for the Sabbath.20  
With the implementation of the draft, the SDA church took 
steps to resolve potential conflicts between the service that their 
noncombatant members would be asked to perform and other core 
religious beliefs.   The SDA church created the National Service 
Organization (NSO), an organization that deals with conflicts that 
arise in the armed forces between noncombatancy and Sabbath 
observance.21 The creation of the NSO made it outwardly clear that 
the SDA church would be readily available and vigilant in the 
handling of its members within the armed forces. 
 In the wake of rising tensions in Europe prior to the start of 
the second World War, the General Conference of SDAs released a 
pamphlet in 1934 that, “urged youth to prepare for noncombatant 
service by graduating in medicine, nursing, dietetics, or some other 
medically related field, or to at least get experience as cooks, 
nurses’ aides, etc.”22 The SDA church also implemented another 
program, similar to their Red Cross training in WWI, but it was 
revised and refined into a collaborative effort with the military and 
army leaders who were used to supervise the program.23 Once the 
war began, the program expanded among the SDA educational and 
religious system. However, some SDAs disfavored the 
involvement and relations between the government and SDA 
church and accused it of being a “part of the national war 
machine.”24 Referred to as ‘reformers,’ the SDA Reform 
Movement began to diverge from mainline SDAs after WWI. The 
movement began in Europe and expanded to the United States. 
SDA Reformers believed that when the General Conference 
adjusted their position of noncombatancy in the beginning of the 
First World War, “the leadership… overthrew the commandments 
of God… Hence, they have the right to exist as a separate 
                                                
20 Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers?,” 198. 
21 Lawson, "Onward Christian Soldiers?," 198 
22 Ronald Lawson, “Church and State at Home and Abroad: The Evolution of 
Seventh-Day Adventist Relations with Governments,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 64, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 290. 
23 Lawson, “Church and State,” 290 






movement… Reform Adventists believe that no true believer could 
ever join the military, even in medical work.”25 For the most part, 
however, SDA reformers were the minority, and mainline SDAs 
supported noncombatant roles in military service. 
With the passage of the Selective Service Act in September 
1940, the SDA once again had to clarify its stand on SDA military 
service versus other classifications such as conscientious objectors 
or noncombatant military service:  
 
Those refusing to bear arms were classified as 
‘conscientious objectors’… During World War II, 
American Adventists enthusiastically embraced the 
national consensus about the rightness of defending 
freedom against aggression of ultra-nationalist 
dictatorships. Noncombatant military service… 
offered a way to prove their patriotism. Moreover, 
their distinguished service demonstrated that 
noncombatancy was not cowardice. Desmond T. 
Doss, with his bravery in winning the Congressional 
Medal of Honor in 1945—the first ever awarded to 
a noncombatant—provided compelling evidence for 
that point.26 
 
However, there was still lingering uncertainty as to whether or not 
SDAs should bear arms. In Atlantic Union Gleaner, an SDA 
newsletter for the Atlantic region, dated December 24, 1941, two 
weeks after the attack at Pearl Harbor, an article entitled “Should 
Our Men Drill with Rifles?” relayed this fear. This article stated 
that “considerable… agitation has been stirred up among our 
people regarding the question as to whether our young men in 
army camps should consent to drill with rifles when pressure from 
army officers is brought upon them…”27 In order to alleviate some 
of the tension felt by men in the military, or planning to enter the 
                                                
25 Gerhard Pfandl, “Information on the Seventh-day Adventist Reform 
Movement,” Biblical Research Institute, July 2003. 
http://www.adventistbiblicalresearch.org (accessed June 25, 2010).   
26 Morgan, Adventist Review: "Between Pacifism and Patriotism.” 
27 Carlyle B. Haynes, “Should Our Men Drill With Rifles?,” Atlantic Union 
Gleaner, December 24, 1941. 
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military, Atlantic Union Gleaner provided, in text, the Definition 
of Noncombatant Training and Service as signed in Executive 
Order on December 6, 1940. It also stated that the SDA 
headquarters was “taking steps… to relieve this pressure at these… 
camps by bringing to the attention of their post commanders the 
official documents which have a bearing upon this particular 
matter.”28 The article also listed the various different task groups 
and assignments that were suitable for 1-A-O29 level COs.  
Because of their dedication to serving both God and 
country, many SDAs in military service refused the label of 
‘conscientious objectors,’ and preferred, instead, the label of 
conscientious cooperators. With this more cooperative position, 
SDAs were more welcomed and received by the military hierarchy 
than other religious groups.30 According to Lawson, “some 12,000 
American Adventists served during World War II as 
noncombatants in medical branches of the services, where they 
could observe the Sabbath conscientiously, with official 
government recognition.”31  
When the Korean and Vietnam Wars commenced, the SDA 
church revived their Medical Cadet Training Program as they 
previously had operating during WWII. In Atlantic Union Gleaner, 
an article on July 17, 1951 explains training at Camp Desmond T. 
Doss. At the close of their training, one man stated “‘I do not fear 
to enter the army service…I want to be faithful in my service to 
my God and my country.’”32 In addition to the revamped training, 
the Korean War also saw the first appointments of SDAs into 
positions of military chaplaincy. This was clearly another step with 
SDA/military relations. This is where the POW story begins. 
 
  
                                                
28 Haynes, 3. 
29 A status of 1-A-O signifies that the individual will participate in military 
activity and will cooperate with military sanctions, but will only assume a 
noncombatant role. 
30 Lawson, "Church and State" 291. 
31 Lawson, "Church and State" 291. 







Human Medical Experimentation: An Overview 
 
Human experimentation has been in existence since the early 
development of science, and it is beyond the scope of the paper to 
deal with its extensive history. Nonetheless, it is useful to have a 
brief understanding of the history of medical experimentation in 
order to understand why POW was so different. The Ancient 
Greeks and Romans engaged in occasional vivisection for 
exploratory knowledge in medicine. Many experiments in early 
civilizations were done on condemned criminals because their 
suffering and death was seen as restitution for their crimes and as a 
token for the greater good of society. In the Middle Ages, animals, 
cadavers, and the occasional living human were used to learn about 
the human body.33  
During the Renaissance, an example of experimentation on 
humans can be found in Fallopius, a physician who acquired 
permission to perform experiments on criminals from the duke of 
Tuscany. Throughout the Scientific Revolution, Paracelsus, 
Andreas Vesalius and William Harvey began applying data 
gleaned from the dissections of animals onto the study of humans. 
This resulted in applications of the scientific method, and more 
dangerous experiments being performed on humans.34  
During the 19th and 20th centuries, human experimentation 
increased along with newfound medical theories. Most of the time:  
 
Research was done with treatments or cures in 
mind; in others, treatments were denied or studies 
ignored either because the disease in question was 
limited to black populations or poor immigrant 
groups, or so that researchers could follow the 
progression of an untreated disease from beginning 
to fatal end. The purpose in both instances was 
simply to add to the body of knowledge, regardless 
                                                
33 Andrew Goliszek, In the Name of Science: A History of Secret Programs, 
Medical Research, and Human Experimentation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
2003), xii. 
34 Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik, Responsible Conduct of Research 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 182. 
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of the consequences, or to answer questions 
addressed by basic research.35 
 
Because of this goal-oriented research, many basic human rights 
were violated. For example, Adil Shamoo and David Resnik relate 
how: 
 
In 1895, Henry Heiman, a New York pediatrician, 
infected two mentally retarded boys, 4 and 16 years 
old, with gonorrhea. In 1897, the Italian researcher 
Giuseppe Sanerilii injected yellow fever bacteria 
into five subjects without their consent in order to 
test its virulence… [and] the discoverer of the 
bacillus strain that causes leprosy, Amauer Hansen, 
carried out an appalling experiment on an unwitting 
33-year-old woman when he twice pricked her eye 
with a needle contaminated by nodules of a leprous 
patient.36  
 
Germ theory made experiments of the latter kind more common. In 
1892, Albert Neisser, a professor of dermatology at the University 
of Breslau, wanted to study the possibility of vaccinating healthy 
children from the syphilis virus. To do so, he took samples from 
syphilitics and inoculated three teenage prostitutes and four healthy 
children without acquiring consent from them, their parents or 
guardians. 37   
The notion of consent in early medical experimentation was 
novel and/or occasional at best. Because of social constructions, 
racial theories and social Darwinism, certain people were not seen 
as being as valuable as others, thereby resulting in scientists 
performing some experiments without informed consent. This 
meant that the people most often at risk were those belonging to 
“vulnerable populations: children, mentally ill people, poor people, 
                                                
35 Goliszek, xiii. 
36 Shamoo and Resnik, 183, 185. 
37 William H. Schneider, “History of IRB,” Indiana University-Purdue 
University, Indianapolis, http://www.iupui.edu/~histwhs/G504.dir/irbhist.html 






prisoners, minorities, and hopelessly ill people.”38 Vulnerable 
populations are people whose capacity to provide consent is 
inhibited or questionable. Also considered vulnerable populations 
are: embryos, fetuses, and people who are coerced or pressured 
into participating. Early to early-modern scientists and physicians 
were in a situation where human ethical concerns were either 
nonexistent, or juxtaposed to their desire and commitment to 
critical advances in medicine, science and anatomy. 
In Cuba between 1900 and 1901, Major Walter Reed and 
his acting assistant surgeons wrestled with yellow fever. When 
Jesse Lazear received orders from the Army Medical Corps, he 
acquainted himself with Walter Reed and the two joined forces to 
create a research team to study yellow fever where it originated.39 
Their goal was to study the cause of yellow fever. Previous 
research had led them to assume it was either mosquitoes or 
fomites. The research team in Havana’s “aim was confirmation of 
the mosquito theory and invalidation of the long-held belief in 
fomites.”40 While they were able to prove their theories, another 
important aspect that emerged from this experiment was the notion 
of informed consent. Written in both English and Spanish, and 
done “with the advice of the Commission and others, he [Reed] 
drafted what is now one of the oldest series of extant informed 
consent documents.”41 The informed consent forms required the 
men to be over the age of 25, and allowed them the opportunity to 
exercise their free will. They signed that they were volunteering to 
participate in the experiment “and as a reward for participation 
would receive $100 ‘in American gold,’ with an additional 
hundred-dollar supplement for contracting yellow fever. These 
payments could be assigned to a survivor, and the volunteer agreed 
to forfeit any remuneration in cases of desertion.”42 
 While Reed and his team made efforts in the early 20th 
century towards an ethical model for human experimentation, 
                                                
38 Shamoo and Resnik, 184. 
39 “The United States Army Yellow Fever Commission (1900-1901),” 
University of Virginia Health Sciences Library Historical Collections, 
http://yellowfever.lib.virginia.edu/reed/commission.html (accessed June 15, 
2010).   
40 “The United States Army Yellow Fever Commission.” 
41 “The United States Army Yellow Fever Commission.” 
42 “The United States Army Yellow Fever Commission.” 
Project Operation Whitecoat 
 
 72  
some of the clearest and most recent examples of unethical human 
research can be seen in Nazi and Japanese experimentation during 
WWII. In the concentration camps, the prisoners were at the mercy 
of their captors. Nazi medical doctors within the concentration 
camps had an unfathomable degree of freedom in performing 
experiments. Humans were treated like guinea pigs and subjected 
to the experiments of their physicians’ choice which usually fell 
into at least one of three categories: experiments for military 
research purposes, experiments to prove racial superiority, or 
experiments based on the interest of a particular scientist or 
researcher. Among these (but not limited to these) were typhus 
experiments, malaria experiments, high altitude experiments, 
hypothermia experiments, seawater experiments (to determine 
possibilities for making seawater potable), polygal (blood 
coagulation) experiments, mustard gas experiments, and 
sterilization experiments.   
In China during WWII, the Japanese implemented their 
very own system of medical and biomedical experimentation on 
subjugated people and prisoners-of-war. Unit 731 was “the world’s 
largest and most comprehensive biological warfare programme 
[sic].”43 It was responsible for dropping “plague-infected fleas… 
over Chinese cities, causing epidemics, [and pouring] cholera and 
typhoid cultures… into wells. Prisoners were dissected alive 
without anesthetics. Others were subjected to pressure changes that 
made their bodies literally explode.”44 While there is evidence of a 
American and Japanese cover-up, it is estimated that “more than 
10,000 Chinese, Korean and Russian POWs were slaughtered in 
these experimental facilities.”45 Even as some Nazi doctors were 
condemned at the Nuremberg trials, all the Japanese doctors who 
had been posted to Unit 731 “returned as pillars of the postwar 
medical establishment, as deans of medical schools and heads of 
pharmaceutical companies… [When asked about Unit 731 later, 
                                                
43 “Unit 731: Japan's biological force,” BBC, February 1, 2002, Correspondent, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/1796044.stm (accessed 
June 15, 2010). 
44 “The crimes of Unit 731,” New York Times, March 18, 1995, Late New York  
edition, sec. 1. 






they] complained of wasting the best years of their lives on 
medical research that could not be continued after the war.”46 
The lasting legacy of WWII and human medical 
experimentation was the Nuremberg code. During the Nuremberg 
Trials, one trial was devoted entirely to medicine. Sometimes 
called the Doctors’ Trial, U.S.A. v. Karl Brandt et al transpired 
between 1946 and 1947. During the trial, “twenty-three doctors 
and administrators [were] accused of organizing and participating 
in war crimes and crimes against humanity in the form of medical 
experiments and medical procedures inflicted on prisoners and 
civilians.”47 The doctors were “indicted on four counts: 1. 
conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity; 2. 
war crimes (i.e., crimes against persons protected by the laws of 
war, such as prisoners of war); 3. crimes against humanity 
(including persons not protected by the laws of war); and 4. 
membership in a criminal organization (the SS).”48 The exact 
crimes they were charged with included “twelve series of medical 
experiments concerning the effects of and treatments for high 
altitude conditions, freezing, malaria, poison gas, sulfanilamide, 
bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration, bone transplantation, 
saltwater consumption, epidemic jaundice, sterilization, typhus, 
poisons, and incendiary bombs.”49 The experiments were 
performed on concentration camp inmates and did not involve any 
kind of informed consent. While in some cases, patients found 
ways to be medical test subjects for the ‘perks’ it invoked (i.e. less 
crowded living conditions, more food, not having to work), they 
were subject to the will of the camp doctor and could be sent off 
for experimentation as easily as they could be sent off for 
dissection or the gas chambers.  
Karl Brandt was the primary defendant because of his 
position as the “senior medical official of the German government 
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during World War II; other defendants included senior doctors and 
administrators in the armed forces and SS.”50 The results of the 
trials were staggering. Brandt and six others were sentenced to 
death and executed, nine others were given lengthy prison terms, 
while the rest were acquitted. Besides the executions and prison 
terms, the Nuremberg code was established for appropriate codes 
of conduct for ethical research using human beings. 
Following WWII, human medical experimentation was 
forced to revise itself according to the horrors that had been seen 
via Nazi and Japanese medical experimentation. However, 
research purposes shifted from germ theory to creating new 
biochemical weaponry. Much of this shift in the United States can 
be attributed to the newfound information acquired from giving 
impunity to certain perpetrators of WWII, particularly Unit 731, in 
exchange for research and data.  
Despite the Nuremberg code, ethical abuses persisted for 
quite some time. One of the reasons for this may be that “many 
researchers here [in the U.S.] thought the Nuremberg Code applied 
only to ‘barbarians’ and not to ‘civilized physician investigators’… 
so human-subject research was not as strongly influenced by the 
principles of the Nuremberg Code as it ought to have been.”51 A 
striking example of this is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. 
Though it began in the 1930s, it continued well into the 1970s. 
This study, which occurred in public health facilities in Tuskegee, 
Alabama, was designed to study effects of later-stage syphilis on 
African-American men.52 Funded by the U.S. Department of 
health, six hundred men participated in this study. Those who 
participated were not informed that they had syphilis or that they 
were partaking in a medical experiment. Infected participants were 
merely told “that they had ‘bad blood’ and could receive medical 
treatment for their condition, which consisted of nothing more than 
medical examinations. Subjects also received free hot lunches and 
free burials.”53 Though a dependable treatment for syphilis was 
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available in the 1940s, it was not administered to the test subjects 
and the experiment continued despite the ethical concerns that this 
raises. 
In the 1950s, thalidomide, an approved drug in Europe, was 
given to pregnant women because physicians believed it to help 
with nausea and sleep deprivation. Unfortunately, it was soon 
learned that exposure to thalidomide during the first trimester of 
pregnancy could cause severe deformities in the fetus. Most the 
women did not know that thalidomide was still an experimental 
drug and did not give informed consent. Thalidomide caused many 
of the babies to have shortened and/or missing limbs. It is 
estimated that “some 12,000 babies were born with severe 
deformities due to thalidomide.”54  
From 1956-1980, “a team of infectious disease experts 
from New York University working under a distinguished 
researcher, Dr. Saul Krugman, had been doing hepatitis research at 
the Willowbrook School on Staten Island, New York.”55 
Willowbrook was a state-run facility for mentally handicapped 
adolescents and children. In “trying to find a way to protect people 
from hepatitis, Krugman and his colleagues deliberately infected 
some of the children with the virus.”56 Though hepatitis isn’t 
generally life threatening, it can cause permanent damage to the 
liver. The conditions at Willowbrook made headlines in the 1960s; 
“viral hepatitis was endemic… most children who entered 
Willowbrook became infected within 6-12 months of admission.”57 
Though Krugman and his team did acquire informed consent from 
the parents of the children, critics of the experiment felt that the 
parents were coerced into acceptance because they could not care 
for their special-needs children on their own and were not fully 
aware of the stipulations of the study. 
In 1964, The Nuremberg code would be revisited in order 
to create a new model for human medical experimentation. The 
“World Medical Association met in Helsinki, Finland to… add… 2 
novel elements [to the basis of the Nuremberg code]: the interests 
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of the subject should always be placed above the interest of 
society; [and] every subject should get the best known 
treatment.”58 The Declaration of Helsinki, however, did not put an 
immediate end to the unethical human experiments that were still 
transpiring, or to future unethical medical experiments. In fact, 
experiments seemed to increase at an alarming rate. For example, 
continuing through the 1960s was the Jewish Chronic Disease 
Hospital Study in which twenty-two elderly, severely ill, and 
mostly demented patients with weak immune systems were 
injected with live cancer cells in order to see the effects and spread 
of cancer on those with compromised immune systems.59 Between 
1963 and 1973, a million-dollar Atomic Energy Commission study 
used prison inmates from Oregon and Washington and had their 
testicles irradiated.60 The government used “approximately 6,700 
human subjects… in experiments involving psychoactive 
chemicals [like LSD]… Other agents were also used, including 
morphine, Demerol, Seconal, mescaline, atropine, and 
psilocybin.”61 Pregnant women and mentally handicapped children 
were fed radioactive iron, and cereal, respectively; all without 
informed consent or an awareness of their participation in the 
studies. 
Though many tests were under the individual supervision 
of the directing scientists or physicians, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) “and other national security agencies conducted or 
sponsored extensive radiological, chemical, and biological research 
programs.”62 Since these were largely for military intelligence, the 
scientific and military communities cooperated together for more 
than thirty years to attempt to stay ahead of the United States 
military rivals.63 Because of their secretive nature, the exact 
number of experiments and test participants remained hidden from 
public knowledge.64 The secret nature of the programs and 
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experiments has also made it difficult for test subjects to acquire 
deserved medical care later in life. While the government does 
offer compensation for its employees (military and civilian) who 
have been injured on the job, the lack of information, risks, and 
centralized information has caused difficulty for those who had 
experiments performed on them from 1940-1974 and are 
attempting to claim poor health as a result.65 The scope of tests 
conducted under military or federal direction served to “support 
weapon development programs, identify methods to protect the 
health of military personnel against a variety of diseases and 
combat conditions, and analyze U.S. defense vulnerabilities.”66  
 
 
Project Operation Whitecoat 
 
Project Operation Whitecoat was a project to identify and protect 
civilians and the military from biological and chemical agents. 
Since the use of these agents in earlier wars, the desire to 
investigate these weapons and their effects became a military 
priority.67  Project Operation Whitecoat originated from a smaller 
test called CD-22. CD-22 was a coordinated effort between the 
“Chemical and Medical elements of the Army and involved the 
supervision of the Secretary of the Army, Army Chief of Staff, and 
the Secretary of Defense.”68 In October of 1954, Lt. Colonel W.D. 
Tigertt of the U.S. Army contacted Theodore R. Flaiz, M.D., 
Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference of 
SDAs. In a memorandum from Tigertt to Major General George E. 
Armstrong, MC, the Surgeon General of the Department of the 
Army, Tigertt explains the letter he wrote to Flaiz. In the memo, he 
states he contacted Dr. Theodore R. Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical 
Department for the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists 
as he wrote:  
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To ascertain the views of his church organization as 
they relate to the use of volunteers in medical 
research…Dr. Flaiz proposed that it should be 
considered by a small group of the Conference 
Officers and agreed to bring such a group together 
during the week of 18 October. Dr. Flaiz appeared 
to be extremely interested and to consider that it 
was a real opportunity for members of the Seventh-
Day Adventist group to assist in the national 
defense. It is possible that the Church will actively 
support the project and assist in obtaining the 
necessary volunteers.69 
 
Major General Armstrong, too, followed up with a letter to Dr. 
Flaiz that expressed his hope that the General Conference of SDAs 
would find the program acceptable and suitable for SDA 
participation. Participation, Major General Armstrong stated, 
would allow SDAs to “make yet another significant contribution to 
our nation’s health and to our national security.”70  
On October 19, 1954, Dr. Flaiz replied to Major General 
Armstrong. In the letter, he stated that the General Conference 
“appreciated very much Colonel Tigertt’s clear and patient 
delineation of the plan for the medical research project… If any 
one should recognise [sic] a debt of loyalty and service for the 
many courtesies and considerations received from the Department 
of Defense… Adventists, are in a position to feel a debt of 
gratitude for these kind considerations.”71 He continued that the 
General Conference felt that “the type of voluntary service which 
is being offered to our boys in this research problem offers an 
excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service 
which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public 
health generally… It should be regarded as a privilege to be 
identified with this significant advanced step in clinical 
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research.”72 The letter ends stating that the General Conference 
would work on releasing a statement regarding the subject within a 
few days. In the statement, it is expressed “it is the attitude of 
Seventh-Day Adventists that any service rendered voluntarily by 
whomsoever in the useful necessary research into the cause and the 
treatment of disabling disease is a legitimate and laudable 
contribution to the success of our nation and to the health and 
comfort of our fellow men.”73  
There are several reasons that might indicate why the 
military sought out SDAs. One aspect, that many like to focus on, 
is that SDAs were considered an ideal control group. With so many 
church principles focusing on health and wellness, SDAs refrained 
from drinking, smoking, most ate a vegetarian diet and most were 
in general good health. According to “Colonel Dan Crozier, then 
commander of USAMRIID [U.S. Army Medical Research Institute 
for Infectious Diseases, previously USAMU, U.S. Army Medical 
Unit]…‘because of high principles and temperate living, Adventist 
men are more nearly uniform in physical fitness and mental 
outlook.’”74  
Another aspect is the commitment of the SDA church to 
medical advancement. Over the course of its history, the SDA 
church had established itself as a premiere health-serving 
institution. Presently, “the SDA church organization owns and 
operates a health care system that includes 168 hospitals, 433 
clinics, and 130 nursing homes or retirement centers. SDA 
educational institutions include 55 nursing schools… [with] 
approximately 7300 nursing students currently enrolled…”75 
According to a report by the National Service Organization of the 
General Conference of SDAs, SDAs were recruited because the 
“volunteers must be men in good health who are motivated to 
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hazard some risk for a humanitarian cause.”76 Further, the fact that 
most of the SDA men recruited for POW had similar backgrounds, 
lifestyle, education and morals allowed for favorable research 
conditions on a group requiring minimal disciplinary actions.  
Another possibility is the relationships that had been 
formed with SDAs and the military through the years of 
established cooperative noncombatancy and Red Cross training 
academies.  Also, it is important to note “Adventist basic trainees 
at Fort Sam Houston, Texas…[were] the largest single group of 1-
A-O soldiers.”77  
SDAs may have also decided to embark on this project 
because medicine was seen as a form of evangelism. According to 
Francis McLellan Wilcox, former editor for the Review and 
Herald, an SDA magazine, “this work [of evangelism] has been 
carried forward in four great divisions, namely, evangelistic, 
publishing, educational, and medical… all of these agencies should 
be used for the accomplishment of one end,—the salvation of 
souls.”78 Regardless, with the approval from the General 
Conference, recruitment and testing began almost immediately. In 
November of 1954, Lt. Col. Tigertt recruited twelve individuals 
from Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, TX. On December 30, 1954, 
the twelve recruits left Fort Sam Houston to Camp Detrick near 
Frederick, Maryland and on January 14, 1955, the secretary of the 
Army granted the authority to permit “research investigation 
utilizing volunteers in defense against biological warfare.”79 In all, 
Tigertt “indicated that approximately 80% of Seventh Day 
Adventists who qualify and are approached by him do volunteer 
for this particular assignment.”80 
 CD-22 was a series Q-fever tests. Q-fever is a “zoonotic 
disease… [and is transmitted to] humans usually… by 
inhalation.”81 Once an individual was designated for CD-22, and 
later, Project Operation Whitecoat service, they were forbidden 
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from receiving vaccines for typhus, yellow fever, cholera and the 
plague while in basic training. For CD-22, volunteers from Camp 
Detrick were flown to Fort Dugway, Utah and were exposed to Q-
fever via wind measures. Others remained at Camp Detrick and 
were exposed via aerosol measures in the notorious eight ball 
sphere, used for containment and disbursement of airborne 
pathogens and directed to the inhaler.  
In the experiments, the volunteers were “ordered onto 
wooden platforms at various levels. When the atmospheric 
conditions were right… medical officers conducting the tests put 
on their gas masks and radioed to overhead aircraft to commence 
dispersing the infectious agent onto the test sight.”82 The purpose 
of the experiment was to acquire “dose-response data on… Q-fever 
in humans.”83 After being exposed to the infecting bacteria, 
Coxiella burnetii, the men returned to Fort Detrick for  
“monitoring and observation.”84 Exposure to C. burnetii can cause 
fever, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, chills, sweat, weakness, and 
malaise. When the men returned to Fort Detrick, they “were left to 
develop fever for three days before antibiotic therapy was 
initiated.”85 Q-fever investigations were “terminated… in 1956 
after yielding the first scientific data of its kind, gathered by U.S. 
military investigations from experiments conducted on human 
volunteer subjects.”86 Tigertt and Beneson (another doctor 
involved in the experiments) published the results of the Q-fever 
tests in Transactions of the Association of American Physicians in 
1956. 
When tests for CD-22 were terminated, a new phase of 
tests was to begin but with a much broader scope. Project 
Operation Whitecoat was designed to test:  
 
The vulnerability of man to biological agents; 
prevention and treatment of BW (biowarfare) 
casualties; and identification of biological agents. 
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Information such as the minimum infectious 
dosage, effectiveness of prophylactic and 
therapeutic measures, serologic responses to 
infection and the effects of various doses of 
inoculum, eventually provided answers to most 
initial questions contained within the research 
objectives.87 
 
Again, Camp Detrick would serve as the experimental test center.  
Camp Detrick came into existence in the early 1940s and was 
intended to serve as a large-scale, militarized research facility. The 
location was ideal because of it’s close proximity to Washington 
DC and the Edgewood Arsenal, a chemical warfare research 
center.88 Camp Detrick, officially named in April 1943, was the 
center for early military research of “vaccines, toxoids, antibiotics, 
disinfectants, and antiseptics… all the while developing techniques 
for detecting, sampling, and identifying many pathogens and their 
toxic products. Simultaneously, sterilization procedures and 
decontamination protocols required development and 
improvement.”89 The termination of CD-22 and the beginning of 
Project Operation Whitecoat coincided with the changing of name 
from Camp Detrick to Fort Detrick, making it a permanent 
facility.90 
Project Operation Whitecoat was no secret to the SDA 
community. In an October 17, 1966 issue of the North Pacific 
Union Gleaner, an article was devoted entirely to POW. POW was 
described as a study “aimed at developing protective measures 
against disease-producing organisms which might be disseminated 
by an enemy in the event biological warfare is ever used against 
this country.”91 Even youth Bible lessons discussed POW. On 
October 8 and 15, 1963, a two-part lesson plan was given on POW. 
POW, “after eight… years of continuous work… is still going… 
The project simply involves medical experimentation. But as a 
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result of this activity the Army Medical Service has made material 
advances in the development of suitable methods of prevention and 
treatment of infectious diseases… Thus all citizens benefit from 
the program, not only members of the armed forces.”92 It describes 
the experience of Tom Kopko, a young GI, and his first 
experiences as a POW volunteer. The article follows him from his 
plane ride from Fort Detrick to his testing area. It describes a wind 
experiment similar to the aforementioned CD-22 experiment. 
When the conditions for the experiment were right, the experiment 
commenced. After the experiment, the men were taken back to 
their test center and “‘were told to remove our clothing as quickly 
as possible. A warm shower came next… we then went through an 
ultra-violet-light area and found ourselves in a room where our 
regular Army clothes were waiting for us.’”93 The duration of the 
individual test was short. When the men returned to Fort Detrick, 
they were placed in isolation where they were monitored 
throughout the day for several weeks or months, depending on the 
individual.  
Throughout the duration of POW, the volunteers “were 
involved in 153 research projects to determine the safety of 
vaccines and antibiotics and prevention and treatment of… Q 
Fever, Tularemia, Sandfly Fever, Typhus Fever, Typhoid Fever, 
Rift Valley Fever, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Yellow Fever, 
Plague, and Eastern, Western and Venezuelan Equine 
Encephalitis.”94 Other tests and experiments sought to test the 
effectiveness of protective materials such as masks and suits, 
others endured hypothermia and sleep deprivation tests and other 
tests sought to develop appropriate “decontamination processes… 
[for use] in the space program, in hospitals, biological outbreaks 
(e.g., present bioterrorism) and for the protection of research 
workers.”95 
The SDA church’s participation in POW did not go without 
consequence or insult. In University Scope, the newspaper for 
Loma Linda University, an article entitled “GC panel denies aid 
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charge to biological warfare test” explains one of the more 
prominent accusations against the church for its participation in 
POW. During the turbulent social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, 
links between church and government brought heated debates and 
accusations, one of which charged SDAs with helping the 
government create biological weapons. In light of these attacks: 
 
A committee of the General Conference of Seventh-
day Adventists, under the chairmanship of Neal C. 
Wilson, vice-president of the North American 
division, was appointed to investigate the project. 
On September 11, Mr. Wilson and six other 
members of the committee, including two 
physicians, visited Fort Detrick and the 
commanding officer of Project Whitecoat, Colonel 
Daniel Crozier, U.S. Army.96 
 
The committee visited Fort Detrick, acquired material evidence 
and was to issue a report of its findings to Adventist colleges and 
universities. Dr. Winton Beaven, one of the physicians on the 
committee, was responsible for reporting the findings. When: 
 
Speaking for the committee [he said], ‘…the project 
has no relationship to…chemical or biological 
warfare, either directly or indirectly… the Army 
directive which established Project Whitecoat 
clearly reads that it is related to defensive aspects in 
developing… biological protective measures, 
diagnostic procedures, and therapeutic methods… 
None of the work in this project is used to improve 
bacteriological weapons of the United States.’97  
 
He stated that POW was not classified. He also stated that 
professionals, both within and outside of the armed forces, 
performed the tests that were based on sound research, and these 
same professionals conducted the monitoring after the 
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experiments. According to the article, Dr. Beaven explained, 
criticism was being directed towards POW because its experiments 
were being performed in the building adjacent to the one housing 
the top-secret experimentation. According to Beaven, POW was 
freely accessible and not top-secret.98 According to Clark Smith, 
director of the NSO, “less than one percent of the Whitecoat work 
is classified… the only reason so much remains unpublished is that 
it is not complete.”99 As experiments were completed, many were 
published in highly reputable journals. For example, in 1966, the 
American Society for Microbiology published a POW study for 
peer review. At the end of the article entitled “Antibiotic 
Prophylaxis and Therapy of Airborne Tularemia,” the scientists 
specifically stated “these studies were supervised by the 
commission on Epidemiological Survey of the Armed Forces 
Epidemiological Board. The cooperation of the War Service 
Commission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church… [is] 
gratefully acknowledged.”100 
 The church was greatly involved in the operations of POW. 
When Tigertt went to Fort Sam Houston to recruit more SDAs to 
POW, Elder Clark Smith of the NSO went with him to assure the 
men that, while their service to this project was voluntary and up to 
their own personal discretion, the church approved it as a form of 
noncombatant service. When a man wanted to participate in POW, 
he was interviewed to examine psychological health and was 
requested to fill out a questionnaire provided by Elder Smith. An 
SDA chaplain was allowed to be present during briefings and 
interviews. The local SDA chaplain was provided with a finalized 
list of POW participants “…for posting on [the] church bulletin 
board.”101 Elder Smith was also allowed to answer questions 
should they arise, and the local SDA chaplain helped arrange 
housing for married recruits. 
 In an early U.S. Army Medical Research and Development 
Command meeting regarding POW, Col. Tigertt knew right away 
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that it was essential to maintain amicable terms between 
USAMRIID and the SDA church. In the minutes of that meeting it 
states “this relationship was essential to continue work at his 
laboratory…”102 Tigertt felt that failing to keep up on their part of 
the bargain would be a blow to the relations between the 
government and the cooperation with the SDA church. Further, in 
order to maintain these good relations, Col. Tigertt recommended 
that those POW men who wished to stay on assignment after their 
experiment be allowed to do so in order to gain medical 
experience. According to Tigertt, “…these personnel are good 
men, educated and in a number of cases will continue their 
education in medicine… If it were the policy that personnel who… 
participate in Operation Whitecoat would be denied the additional 
specialized training… a large number of those personnel who had 
ordinarily applied… would no longer apply.”103 By maintaining a 
mutually beneficial relationship, USAMRIID would get the 
volunteers it needed to conduct its research, the SDA church would 
maintain its right to noncombatancy, and volunteers would be 
allowed experience with medical research. 
 The church was even involved at the local level. Frederick 
SDA Church, being the closest SDA church to Fort Detrick, 
provided these men with a church community away from home. 
Even though medical aid was seen as an acceptable form of ‘work’ 
on the Sabbath, POW volunteers got Saturdays off. Frederick SDA 
church members Dr. Frank Damazo and his wife took it upon 
themselves to take care of these fellow SDAs for the duration of 
their stay, and the duration of the project itself. Very quickly, the 
entire “…congregation provided interest, care, and support for all 
Whitecoat members… This church gave special help to those men 
and families nearby during the entire time the program was in 
operation.”104 Frequently, potlucks and fellowships would be held 
at church members’ homes so that the POW volunteers and church 
members could have the opportunity to become acquainted on an 
individual basis.  
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Guarded Secret or Misunderstanding?  
 
Because of the openness of the experiments and the ability for the 
men involved to associate with other volunteers and people outside 
of the experiment, there was no element of secrecy in POW. With 
the wide variety of primary sources (both religious and secular) 
offering articles and experimental research findings, it is seemingly 
incomprehensible to conclude that POW was a secret government 
experiment to create biological offensive weapons.  
 It was in the church’s best interest to maintain contact with 
military personnel to ensure that their support of a particular 
program was not given under false pretenses or inaccurate 
information. It was also in the best interest of military personnel to 
ensure that POW was performed with the utmost ethical standards. 
The informed consent forms for volunteers were very explicit and 
clear. The volunteer had written permission to “revoke… consent, 
and withdraw from the study without prejudice.”105 
 Another clear indication of a difference between POW and 
other military medical experiments is the bond and community that 
POW test subjects still have today. POW volunteers have engaged 
in reunions for approximately two and a half decades. Reunions 
are typically alternated between east and west coast, with most east 
coast reunions at Frederick SDA church. POW volunteers are not 
anonymous; they have names, files, informed consent forms, 
photographs, reunions, and mailing lists. If the military attempted a 
secretive biological offensive warfare program with POW, then 
they failed to do so. This is quite evident in the amount of 
correspondence and literature that was out at the time: the church 
leadership and the church members knew about it. 
POW was created with the intent to serve as a defensive 
measure against biological warfare. Whether or not information 
acquired from POW was used as a measure of offensive biological 
warfare is a matter of debate, but with all advancements in science, 
information can be used as easily for both good and evil. Radiation 
can be harmful, but when used effectively can cure cancer. 
Surgical advancements in reproductive health can allow a couple 
that no longer wishes to conceive to sterilize themselves, but 
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people were forcibly sterilized in the early 20th century around the 
globe for being genetically inferior. POW is no different from 
these aforementioned examples. If the knowledge is there to help 
someone, then the information can just as easily be construed to 
harm someone. The dialectic of medical theory applies no more to 
POW than it does to studies of other medical conditions. 
POW was disbanded in 1973. Some sources indicate this 
date because it was the year the draft ended. Others, however, cite 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 and the 
resulting treaty calling for the end of all biological weapon 
production, development and stockpiling as another possible 
reason for the formal end of this program. However, if the latter of 
the two options is correct in determining why POW ended, this is 
disconcerting to those who believe POW to be directed for the 
purpose of defensive measures. For according to the treaty, all 
signatories must destroy or “divert to peaceful purposes” all 
biological agents, toxins, weapons, etc.106 If POW were purely 
defensive or peaceful, said treaty obligations would not have 
applied to it. Further, no documentary evidence linking the two 
events has been found. However, the end of the draft may also 
have caused a disbanding in POW, as the end of conscription 
would limit the influx of 1-A-Os, thereby depleting their exclusive 
test group and necessitating a new, more open biological test 





Presently, the SDA church’s position on the military has shifted 
dramatically. While it still does not encourage its members to 
actively enlist in the military, it recognizes free, individual choice. 
Ideally, it would have its members serve in noncombatant roles, 
but it does not castigate those who choose combatant roles; “while 
the church ministers to noncombatant members in the army, as 
well as to pacifists and combatants, it recognizes that individuals 
                                                
106 “Biological Weapons Convention,” Article II, 







make free choices…”107 As a result, the SDA church is still 
actively involved in its members’ military affairs. According to an 
article in the SDA Biblical Research Institute website, theologian 
Angel Rodriguez states, “when service in the military may result in 
an open conflict with religious convictions… we [the church] must 
be willing to enter into dialogue with government officials in an 
effort to obtain for our members the right to practice their religious 
convictions while in the military.”108  
While some may question the church’s involvement in 
government and/or military affairs, one thing remains certain: were 
it not for the SDA church’s active involvement in Project 
Operation Whitecoat, it is feasible that the many men who 
volunteered could have become unidentifiable statistics and 
numbers, without names, faces or voluntary consent forms, subject 
to medical health uncertainties—anonymous, and only 
remembered or represented as figures at a congressional hearing 
for restitution and identification of former military medical 
experiment test subjects. The SDA church played an important and 
integral role in ensuring the ethical standards prescribed by the 
Nuremburg Code and the Helsinki Declaration were followed in 
the dealings with its members as test subjects in POW. Further 
research is necessary to determine the full extent of church 
involvement and to gain a clearer understanding of why POW was 
disbanded. Doing so could prove that some U.S. government and 
military experimentations were not buried under a dark shroud of 
mystery and deception. 
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